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Denning: The Discipline of Law ,  The Rt. Hon. Lord 
Denning, M.R., London: Butterworths, 1979. Pp. 331. $21.95 (cloth), 
$12.35 (paperback).
T h ro u g h o u t a lengthy judicial career, Lord D enning has exerted an 
abiding influence on the course and developm ent o f English common 
law. W riting in The Times o f 5 January , 1977, Sir Leslie Scarman, a Lord 
Justice o f Appeal and first chairm an o f the English Law Commission, 
went so far as to say: “T h e  past 25 years will not be forgotten in o u r 
legal history. T hey are the age o f legal aid, law reform  — and Lord 
D enning.”1 Irrespective o f w hether we share Lord Justice Scarm an’s 
view (and there are m any who do not), we may welcome the publication 
o f The Discipline o f Law  on the occasion o f Lord D enning’s 80th birthday: 
for the book provides the reader, layman and specialist alike, with a 
personal survey by the M aster o f  the Rolls o f some o f the principal 
developm ents in English law during  the past q u arte r o f a century and 
m ore.
T h e  them e that runs like a connecting thread  th rough  the essays 
that com prise the book is succinctly stated in the preface. It is “that the 
principles o f law laid down by the Judges in the 19th century — 
however suited to the social conditions o f that time — are not suited to 
the social necessities and social opinion o f the 20th century. T hey should 
be m olded and shaped to m eet the needs and opinion o f today.”2 In 
pursuit o f  this them e Lord D enning exam ines some o f the principles 
w here progress has been most m arked and in which he him self has 
taken some part. He quotes extensively (and, one m ight point out, 
selectively) from  his judgm ents. He quotes himself, he explains, “not out 
o f conceit” but in the hope that proposals contained in the judgm ents 
which have not met with approval m ight “be discussed in the Law 
Schools: and perhaps in fu tu re years find acceptance.”3
T he book is divided into seven essays, each o f which is devoted to 
exam ination o f a legal principle that has developed and changed in 
response to the challenge o f the changing social conditions o f the 20th 
century. T h e  topics canvassed are: the construction o f docum ents; 
misuse o f ministerial power; locus standi; abuse o f “g roup” powers; H igh  
Trees; negligence; the doctrine o f precedent. T h e  modus operandi is 
identical in each o f the essays. Lord D enning first delineates his problem  
and then proceeds to discuss the solution that it has received at the 
hands o f the m odern judiciary. He makes copious use o f his judgm ents 
and o ther writings and connects them  all together with a runn ing
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com m entary that is replete with observations concerning recent trends 
and developm ents. T he  tone o f the whole is unasham edly subjective and 
one detects a note o f self-justification throughout. T h e  subject m atter, as 
evidenced by the list o f topics canvassed, is vast. T h ro u g h  it all, however, 
sight is never lost o f the underlying them e: that the law m ust be m ade 
fit for the times in which we live.
As Lord D enning puts his case, m aking the law fit for the times in 
which we live means rejecting a purely technical approach. In the 
opening  essay, devoted to the construction o f docum ents, he claims that 
the lawyer should not let “the words o f the deed be the m asters: but so 
construe them  — adapt them  as the occasion dem ands — so as to do 
what justice and equity require.”4 T h e  argum ent recurs in one form  or 
ano ther in each o f the essays in the book. It finds a m etaphorical 
form ulation in the Romanes Lecture delivered at O xford in May 1959 
and liberally extracted in the final essay. T h ere  Lord D enning argues 
that a mechanical, purely technical, approach “is all very well for the 
working lawyer who applies the law as a working mason lays bricks, 
w ithout any responsibility for the building which he is making. But it is 
not good enough for the lawyer who is concerned with his responsibility 
to the com m unity at large. He should ever seek to do his part to see that 
the principles o f law are consonant with justice.”5 It appears that Lord 
D enning is in agreem ent with Plato that in a well-ordered society the law 
should be in accord with the dictates o f equity and justice. He holds 
fu r th e r that when the law and justice are out o f step not only is the 
public’s confidence in the law shaken, but the very stability o f society 
itself is underm ined.
T h e  claim that the principles o f law should be consonant with the 
dem ands o f justice and equity involves calling into question an inflexible 
application o f the doctrines o f precedent and stare decisis. This Lord 
D enning does implicitly th roughout the book; but it is in the seventh 
essay that the issue is met head on. With his own position that the law 
m ust be ever ready to respond to the challenge o f changing social 
conditions he contrasts the strict constructionist approach o f Lord 
Simonds, who incidentally figures as the bète noire o f the entire narrative. 
T h e  M idland Silicones case is cited. T h ere  Lord Simonds stated that he 
would not “easily be led by an undiscerning zeal for some abstract kind 
o f  justice to ignore o u r first duty, which is to adm inister justice 
according to law, the law which is established for us by Act o f Parliam ent 
o r the binding authority o f  p recedent.”6 Lord Denning says that it was 
the inflexible attitude towards precedent and stare decisis o f law Lords o f 
the Lord Simonds ilk that led in large part to his decision to step down 
from  the House o f Lords. For in the House o f Lords, he points out, a
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dissenting opinion is o f little effect; while in the C ourt o f Appeal it can 
be o f some good. As examples o f instances where a dissent in the C ourt 
o f  Appeal pointed the way for new developm ent the cases inter alia of 
Conway v. Rim m er7 on crown privilege, Padfield's case8 on ministerial 
responsibility and Candler v. Crane, Christmas9 on negligent statem ents are 
listed.
As one m ight guess, Lord Denning applauds the 1966 Practice 
Statem ent by the House o f Lords. He regrets, however, that the 
statem ent was not m eant to apply elsewhere than in that House. He 
argues that even in term ediate Courts o f  Appeal, on special occasions 
and in the absence o f higher authority  on the subject under 
consideration, should play their part in ensuring  that the law keeps pace 
with contem porary conditions and contem porary thought. Which is not 
to say that the M aster o f  the Rolls is opposed to the doctrine o f 
precedent. He is not “All that I am against is its too rigid
ap p lica tio n .............. [sir] My plea is simply to keep the path to  justice
clear o f  obstructions which would im pede it.”10
What one misses amidst all this talk o f bringing the law into 
harm ony with justice is an analysis o f the principles in accordance with 
which justice is to be understood. T he  issue is raised now here in the 
book, though it is central throughout. In an earlier work, The Road to 
Justice, 11 “Lord D enning did provide some indication o f the kind o f thing 
he might have in mind. He said: “. . .justice is not som ething you can 
see. It is not tem poral but eternal. How does man know what is justice? 
It is not the product o f  his intellect but o f  his spirit. T h e  nearest we can 
get to defin ing justice is to say that it is what right-m inded m em bers o f 
the com m unity — those who have the right spirit within them  — believe 
to be fair.”12 This is hardly a penetrating analysis; and perhaps it is not 
fair to dem and an ontology o f justice from  Lord Denning. For he is a 
m em ber o f the practicing judiciary, concerned not with the academic 
jurisprudential niceties, but with the concrete application o f legal principles 
to complex contem porary problems. However, one cannot help but think 
that the absence o f a closely-reasoned conceptual analysis is a failing. 
Certainly it makes Lord D enning an easy m ark for critics who would 
claim (though to my m ind wrongly) that his talk o f justice is a 
convenient cloak for judicial caprice and arbitrariness.
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C om parisons are odious and, m ore often than not, unenlightening. 
Is Lord D enning the greatest ju d g e  o f the day, as Lord Justice Scarman 
seems to think? O r does this honour belong to Lord Reid? Do his 
judgm ents display the breadth  o f vision and legal acum en o f an Atkin? 
Will his influence be lasting; o r will it be ephem eral? “Q uestions such 
as these are overly simplistic; if asked at all they are better left to a time 
when the obfuscating clouds o f controversy that have su rrounded  the 
man have lifted. W hat one can confidently say about Lord D enning 
is that he has been actuated th roughou t his judicial career by a desire 
to see that the law is brought into conform ity with the dem ands o f 
contem porary conditions. This goal, no m atter how strongly one 
may disagree with his perception o f the time and o f the dictates o f 
justice, deserves o u r com m endation.
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Environmental Law Commentary and Case Digests,
Robert T. Fran son and Alastair R. Lucas, Toronto: Butterworths, 1978. 
Pp. 400. $15.50 (paperback).
T his book is a bound edition o f Volume I o f the au thors’ 6-volume 
looseleaf service “C anadian Environm ental Law”.
T he scheme o f the 6-volume service is such that Volume I provides 
a written text describing and analyzing the subject m atter o f 
environm ental law. T h e  second part o f Volume I contains digests o f 
environm ental law cases.
Volumes II to VI o f the service contain the text o f various statutes 
and regulations dealing with environm ental matters. T hese m atters are 
sub-divided by jurisdiction.
T h e  6-volume service has been well received which is not surprising 
given the em inence o f  its authors and the utility o f a service which is 
updated  four times each year. Since its publication, eleven updates have 
been issued.
